Hvorfor går det ofte så langsomt med at omsætte advarsler om truende katastrofer som sult og hungersnød til hurtig indsats? Forskere har set nærmere på den handlingslammelse og tøven, som risikerer at koste titusinder livet.
LONDON, 9 July 2012 (IRIN): No one can say they did not see last year’s food crisis in East Africa coming; there was almost a year of increasingly strong warnings, but it was not until Somalia was formally declared to be in a state of famine that substantial funding finally started coming in.
After this, just the latest of a long series of failures to translate early warnings into timely action, researchers at London’s Chatham House embarked on a project to try to find out why.
Rob Bailey, who is leading the project, says previous research had tended to focus on technical issues:
“If only we could improve the early warning information; if only we could improve the way organizations coordinate with each other, then we would be able to get a better response”.
“This has been the focus in research and policymaking for the past couple of decades, and yet it has only really demonstrated marginal improvements at best, and it did nothing at all in the case of Somalia last year.”
Why is delay the typical outcome of decision-making?
Instead Bailey says he wants to understand why delay is the typical outcome of the decision-making process, and why politicians, nationally and internationally, might be unwilling to acknowledge a crisis and respond early on. Some pointers have already emerged.
Participants in discussions organized by the project have suggested that the current pressure for greater accountability (ansvarlighed) and value for money may cause problems.
A drought is no one’s fault, but the decision to spend large sums of public money on a crisis which does not materialize can be traced back to an individual, with potentially career-threatening consequences.
And modern communication systems, like e-mail, can diffuse information widely, while allowing everyone to leave the decision to someone else.
Something as simple as demanding an explicit decision, even if that decision is not to act, could remove some of the perverse incentives to inaction.
Decision-makers also prefer a high degree certainty, for instance over how many people are going to die if they do not take action, and that is a degree of certainty that forecasters do not always feel able to give.
Speed and attitudes of national governments
Gary Eilerts, programme manager for USAID’s Famine Early Warning System, FEWS NET, says rapid improvements in communications mean that the forecasts are now more accurate than ever before.
“It is much easier to get information from distant localities, and of a much broader nature,” he told IRIN, adding:
“It has just increased everybody’s ability to understand what is going on… but there is still a substantial residue (rest) of uncertainty when we put all these indicators and this data together, so that we can still have a divergence in how people analyse it, and how we determine what the right response should be.”
And FEWS NET deals with governments – just one or two people in each country, says Eilerts. “We put a high premium on trying to work within regional and national systems, because ultimately they have the responsibility to the people,” added he.
So a lot of the speed of response depends on the systems – and the attitude – of national governments.
Systems can be improved. The annual rainfall pattern across the Sahel means that as early as October it is clear whether or not the rains have been adequate, and whether there is likely to be a food crisis the following year.
Mandatory meetings scheduled in October to review the position and consider a menu of options could start the ball rolling sooner.
The primacy of politics
Læs videre på
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95827/AID-POLICY-Early-warning-into-early-action
Se også telegrammet
http://www.u-landsnyt.dk/nyhed/04-07-12/n-r-vi-hj-lper-folk-i-n-d-har-de-s-noget-skulle-ha
