Perspectives on the Crisis in Darfur
By: Øystein H. Rolandsen, Horn of Africa Advisor, Norwegian Peoples Aid. Oslo, Norway
The peace process between the government of Sudan and the southern-based Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had a breakthrough in the summer of 2002 when the Machakos protocol was signed. This process has received considerable coverage in international media, but more recently the conflict in Darfur has often been mentioned as a counter-balance to triumphs at the negotiation table.
The two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have displayed military capabilities that clearly threaten the central governments position in the region. Despite massive coverage the crisis in Darfur is still presented as an isolated event.
A broader perspective in terms of history and implications for political processes elsewhere in the Sudan and within the region helps to explain the causes of the conflict and the way it is being fought. A comprehensive analysis of these issues needs more space, but some elements of the context of the conflict are presented below.
Historical roots of the conflict
The history of Darfur is an important factor when explaining the background to the current conflict. From the 15th century until its conquest by the Turco-Egyptian regime centred in Khartoum in 1874 Darfur was an autonomous state with strong roots in the local Fur tradition.
After the end of the Mahdist revolution in 1898 until 1916 Darfur was again established as an independent state. Darfur was included in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1916. A system of indirect rule was instituted and during the 1940s, as a modern political system was being established in Northern Sudan, Darfur became a stronghold of the Ansar sect and its Umma party.
Later the Muslim Brotherhood also found supporters in the region. Despite this apparent inclusion in political processes at the centre, the people of Darfur, not even the intellectual elite, were not expected to play an active role in national politics.
There have been constant low-scale conflicts for several decades in Darfur caused by ecological degradation and failed rains; a classic battle for resources, particularly land. The state has lacked policing capacity and as a consequence, it has been common practice among all ethnic groups to arm themselves and organise self-defence mechanisms and minor clashes have occurred from time to time.
When the first reports of heavy fighting in Darfur occurred in January/February 2003 this was an escalation of a conflict in a region where large groups have been excluded and marginalised from political processes and economic development since the establishment of the Sudan as a political entity.
Why a crisis now?
Although the current conflict in Darfur has historical roots it is still necessary to find explanations as to why it started to escalate in early 2003.
It seems that the fear of being further politically marginalised as a consequence of the government of Sudan – SPLM/A peace process was an important factor when the SLM and JEM decided to start attacking military installations in Darfur. Yet, it took a while before the rebels presented any elaborate political programme or list of demands.
SLM has been the group with the presentation of the most coherent and elaborate political programme. Their most important demands are more local autonomy, improved economic development for Darfur, better representation at the national level and an end to ethnic discrimination.
Considering the relatively flexible demands of the rebels it seems that a negotiated settlement would have been preferable to the government of Sudan. This makes it difficult to explain the overly brutal retaliation following the initial attacks from the rebel groups in Darfur.
Even though neither SLM nor JEM has made any secessionist demands, part of the explanation might be that the government of Sudan fears increased regional autonomy will mean that the government loses control in the region. Giving in to these demands could also increase the pressure from marginalised groups in other regions to have similar arrangements. Moreover, there are secessionist sentiments among the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, the Southern Blue Nile and in the Abyei.
However, it is not in the sense that these peoples want to form their own states, but rather that in the event of the establishment of an independent South Sudan they would like to join it. It is not plausible that other regions such as Darfur would also decide to join an independent South. The fear that other discontented groups might follow the example of the JEM and SLM/A may have led the government to feel that is was necessary to demonstrate that rebellion does not pay.
Spill-over effects
Darfur might appear to be a regional backwater, but it is in fact a central piece in the complicated game of domination and destabilisation between Chad, Libya and the Sudan.
The recent developments in Darfur have complicated the relationship between Chad and the Sudan. The main reason for this is that Chads current government with President Idriss Deby is to a large extent dependent on support from the Zaghawa people whose homeland straddles the border between Chad and Darfur. The Zaghawas are also well represented in the SLM and JEM, which put pressure on Deby to sympathise with their cause.
But Chad is a weak state and is dependent on support from the stronger Sudan. For these reasons it was difficult for Deby to play the neutral role as facilitator for peace negotiations as both parties accused him of favouring the other side. That a considerable number of refugees have entered Chadian territory is of course something that now requires political action from the Chadian government.
Libya has had its own agenda for a long time. Some claim that it is Libyan political agitation that has led to the increased focus on the divide between Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur. Continued conflict in Darfur might block the peace process in the South, which as a consequence will affect the Sudan’s relations with all its eastern and southern neighbours as well.
Background of the Janjaweed
The Janjaweed groups are often mentioned and news reports explain in detail their appalling modus operandi. Civilians are the main targets and the objective is to kill or at least expel the agriculturalist population from Darfur.
Recently it has also become commonly known that the Janjaweed have been recruited, outfitted and paid by the Khartoum government. What is less known is that the strategic use of local militias has been a major element in Khartoums counter-insurgency strategy since the mid-1980s. The Government of Sudan has systematically exploited local animosities by arming and enticing local warlords and their followers to fight rebels and harass civilians in hot spots around the country.
For example in the Upper Nile province local groups opposing the SPLM/A have been given arms and funding by the Khartoum government since the early 1980s. Initially they fought the SPLM/A, but during the 1990s these militias were used together with the regular army in the governments attempt to de-populate the oil prospecting areas in western Upper Nile.
More recently, in spring this year, elements of this militia were used in the Shilluk Kingdom in eastern Upper Nile in displacing approximately 100,000 people by attacking and burning down their villages. In the early 1990s, militias took part in an ethnic cleansing process in the Nuba Mountains, which resembles what is happening in Darfur today, as the majority of the Nuba people are Muslim and the area belongs to Northern Sudan.
There are several negative aspects to this fighting by proxy. The most important aspect is the lack of control.
As long as the government uses the militia to attack and plunder it appears that Khartoum can decide where and when the attacks will take place as this corresponds with the militia leaders wishes. But it might become difficult to demobilise and disarm the Janjaweed since this is contrary to the interest of the militias themselves.
In the event that government attempts in earnest to stop the militias it is likely that they will refuse to hand in weapons and they might even decide to use them against their previous allies. It is also worth mentioning that by using local militias to fight their wars, the government in Khartoum is eroding the central state’s monopoly of use of legitimate violence.
This means a further weakening of the Sudan as a state. It also contributes to widening the gap between ethnic groups, which makes peace more difficult to achieve.
Conclusion
The crisis in Darfur is not caused by a local conflict going out of control. It is a reflection of a governance crisis at a national level in the Sudan.
The background to the conflict is similar to that of the South: a late and weak integration in the central state combined with marginalisation and struggle over resources. The peace process in the South is part of the reason why the people in Darfur chose open rebellion, and the Government of Sudans heavy-handed response may be motivated by fear of similar outbreaks elsewhere in the North.
Also the way in which the government of Sudan chooses to fight the rebellion – relying on local milita groups to attack civilians suspected of belonging to ethnic groups that support the rebellion – resembles government strategies in Kordofan as well as in the South. The vested interest of Chad and to some extent Libya in the outcome of the conflict lifts the crisis up to the international level.
As the African Union is deploying troops and extensive international interventions are being debated it is important to be aware of these factors or else such interventions might turn into another Iraq or Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
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