Kommentar: Flybombardementer forlænger kun konflikten i Mali

Forfatter billede

Den bedste opskrift på en langvarig konflikt i det vestafrikanske Sahel-land er bombardementer fra luften og indsættelse af udenlandske styrker – enten handler man hurtigt uden at anrette større skader eller også afsøger man alle veje for en fredelig løsning, mener svensk Afrika-kommentator.

BAGGRUND (U-landsnyt.dk): Franske fly har bombet flere byer i det nordlige Mali i en kampagne mod islamister, som nu har kontrolleret det enorme ørkenagtige område i ni måneder. De har gjort den sagnomspundne by, Timbuktu, til hovedstad i en selverklæret islamisk stat.

Islamisterne har påtvunget befolkningen strenge sharia-love og indført offentlig piskning, offentlige henrettelser og afhugning af lemmer. De har tillige ødelagt flere antikke kulturskatte, herunder kulturelle mindesmærker, som står på UNESCOs Verdensarv-liste.

Af Mats Utas

I have tried to make sense of the long delayed international approving of PKO deployment (indsættelse af fredsbevarende styrker) to the Mali crisis as a sign of maturity in international UN and diplomatic circles.

Without knowing details I have interpreted the situation as peace negotiations must have been at least moderately successful. But now with the French bombing of northern Mali I can only conclude that it is either too late, or too soon.

Although the sudden attacks must have been planned well ahead, something that speaks well with the rapid deployment of West African peacekeepers (a mission that would until a few days ago not happen before well into the autumn this year), the question is now what will happen.

France will probably continue bombing rebel bases in the north, but will not employ soldiers in the region, except for a few in the Malian capital Bamako.

European countries have promised to train both Malian forces and West African peacekeepers, but this will hardly affect the outcome of the crisis.

Dårlige erfaringer

We may get some indications what will come in the future by looking at past West African PKOs and if we look at the chiefly Nigerian missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 90s it is not a pretty picture.

Although ECOMOG (vestafrikanske fredsbevarende) missions to the two countries limited the intensity of the conflicts they clearly also prolonged them.

In both countries the peacekeepers did not only fail to be neutral but very soon after their arrival they became part of the war economy, trading in natural resources, loot (plyndret gods) and arms.

A West African mission in Mali will also have Nigerian forces as its backbone (and I am not saying that Nigerian forces are the only ones with problems or even those with most).

One should be fair to say that the Nigerian army has developed positively over the past ten years or so, but be equally realistic: a West African PKO will become part of the conflict and individual forces will try to benefit economically from their presence – where the most troubling perspective would be involvement in the trans-Saharan drugs trade.

Ultimately, however, if they will be successful or not depends on their ability to navigate a dry, sandy environment something they are not familiar with.

Læs videre på

The best recipe for protracted warfare in Mali is aerial bombing and rushed deployment of peacekeeping forces

Mats Utas er forsker på Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Instituttet i Uppsala i Sverige er centrum for forskning, dokumentation og information om det moderne Afrika i de nordiske lande.